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EMPLOYEE STOCK REPURCHASE
AGREEMENTS*
ERWIN ESSER NEMMERSt
O NE of the aspects of treasury stock1 and the power of a corpora-
tion to buy its own stock which has come to the fore during the
last decades has been the employee stock ownership plan.2 In general,
there are at least two advantages in employee stock ownership.3 The
first is economy in raising capital and the second is increase in employee
loyalty. The first advantage is real and not inconsiderable. In selling
to employees, the marketing costs of the investment banker (which may
run around 10%) are saved. Secondly, and more important, the corpo-
ration has thereby increased its borrowing capacity or if it has no
desire to increase its borrowing capacity, has placed itself in a position
to secure lower interest rates on its bonds, all because it has increased
the stock cushion between the bondholder and insolvency.4
The other and more dubious reason why employee stock ownership
is desirable is that employee loyalty and efficiency will increase.5 The
trouble with this argument is that employee ownership is a double-
*The author is indebted to Professors E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. and Ralph J. Baker,
of Harvard Law School, who have read this paper and made many sugges-
tions.
t Member of the Wisconsin bar; Austin, Lehman and University fellow, Har-
vard University.
1 On the general subject of treasury stock, see Nemmers, Power of a Corpora-
tion to Purchase Its Own Stock, 1942 Wis. L. REv. 161.
2 In general see: Laura A. Thompson, A Selected Bibliography: Employee
Stock Ownership in the United States, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEw OF BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS (June, 1927); NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENDE BOARD,
EMPLOYEE STOcK-PURCHASE PLANS IN THE UNITED STATES (1928) and EM-
PLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLANS AND THE STOCK MAR=ET CRISIS OF 1929 (1930) ;
Hearings before Sub-committee of Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 1933, pt. II at 1919, pt. VI at 1872 et seq. and 1944
et seq.; FOERSTER and DIETEL, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED
STATES (1926). Distinguish agreements to repurchase stock sold by a corpora-
tion from subscriptions made with a secret agreement to return and get
money back. The former involves property belonging to the corporation and it
is free to make contracts to repurchase. The latter involves the rights of sub-
scribers as a whole and is unenforceable as a fraud on fellow stockholders.
Burke v. Smith, 16 Wall. 390 (1872). Cases collected in Note, 101 A.L.R. 154
(1936).
3 Cf. generally, DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (3rd ed., 1934)
1078-1079.
4 This same advantage accrues from customer ownership of stock, cf. Dewing,
supra, n. 3, 1068-1078.5 Employee stock ownership plans of the type here under discussion should be
distinguished from the various plans designed to gear executive compensa-
tion on an equity basis to corporate profits by granting a flat salary plus a
percentage of the net profits and/or stock shares in ratio to net profits as an
added stimulus. Indirectly, the present plan is related to the executive profit-
sharing scheme in that presumably the increased effort of employees will be
reflected in increased earnings which will be distributed to stockholders.
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edged sword. If the business does not prosper, no dividends result and
the employee may have this as an added complaint where wages are
being lowered.8 In addition, in times of depression, the employee may
desire to liquidate some of his savings because of decreased earnings in
some other source of income. To do so, he may desire to call upon the
corporation to repurchase and under the rule that a corporation cannot
be forced to repurchase stock when it is insolvent or will be made so
by the repurchase, the employee's futile efforts may well create ill-will.
Not all employee stock ownership plans call for repurchase clauses,
and these clauses may be of widely different kinds. Certainly the re-
purchase clause is an added selling point. It may provide for repur-
chase on demand, after a stated period or on cessation of employment.
It may provide that the employee only is to have the right to demand
repurchase, or that both employee and employer can demand repur-
chase. It may be an option to repurchase or an obligation to do so, or
both. The variations are obviously numerous and may be dictated by
selfish or sincere motives.
The "loyalty and efficiency" reason for employee stock ownership
has been variously analyzed into further components, such as: stimu-
lating saving by employees, sharing the profits with the workers, giving
employees a voice in management, increasing efficiency and minimizing
labor turnover.'
A special twist is given the subject because stock purchase plans
have been used by corporations in need of new management by offer-
ing new managers stock at depressed prices so that if they are suc-
cessful they will share as stockholders in the new earnings. Or a highly
profitable corporation may be endeavoring to keep its successful man-
agement by such terms."
The cases dealing with repurchase of a corporation's own stock
from an employee are but one class of the larger group dealing with
general repurchase agreements. There is another frequent and impor-
tant group: agreements by corporations (usually utilities) to repur-
chase from customers who have bought stock in the corporation.
8 If employee stock ownership is a palliative for underpayment in the first place,
it is hardly likely to succeed.
7Cf. Fordham, Some Legal Aspects of Employee Stock-Purchase Plans (1930)
8 N. CAR. L. REv. 161; Blackstock, A Corporation's Power to Purchase Its
Own Stock and Some Related Problens (1935) 13 TEX. L. REV. 442. See note,
48 A.L.R. 622 (1926). On the tax aspect see: Bastedo, Taxing Emniployees on
Stock Purchases (1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 239. This article avoids duplication of
certain aspects dealt with in the articles just mentioned.
a On this aspect see a series of works by J. C. BAKER, EXECUTIVE SALARIES AND
BONUS PLANS (1938) ; Executive Compensation Policies of Small Industrial
Companies (1938) 16 HARV. Bus. REV. 446; Stock Options for Executives
(1940) 18 HARV. Bus. REv. 106; and Executie Campensation Practices in
Retail Companies, 1928-1939. Harv. Bus. School Division of Research, Busi-
ness Research Studies, No. 23, July, 1939; S.E.C., Official Summary of Secur-
ity Transactions and Holdings (March, 1935).
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Perhaps the first case dealing with the validity of employee repur-
chase agreements of a corporation was Fleitmann v. Stone Cotton
Mills.9 In that case the corporation agreed to give its selling agency
to plaintiffs who bought $15,000 of defendant's stock, the corporation
agreeing to repurchase the stock if it terminated the plaintiff's agency.
In a summary opinion on this point, the court granted specific perform-
ance to the agents when the corporation terminated the agency but
refused to repurchase the stock.
A few months later, in Strodl v. The Farish-Stafford Co.'0 a North
Carolina corporation was sued in New York as successor to a Con-
necticut corporation by a former employee who claimed the corpora-
tion had entered into a contract to repurchase his shares if he left the
employ of the company. The law of a foreign jurisdiction not having
been pleaded, the court found the common law did not hold such a
contract void as against public policy. The contract in this case involved
a promise by the employee to sell upon cessation of employment, a
feature which was not present in the Fleitman case. There is a dictum
in the case where it is said there must be a surplus to carry out the re-
purchase, but the burden of showing that no surplus exists is on the
corporation."
Then followed what have become two leading cases on the subject,
Richards v. Weiner Co.,12 and Re Tichenor-Grand Co.' 3 In the former
case, the plaintiff purchased stock on the corporation's promise to
9 186 Fed. 466, 108 C.C.A. 444 (C.C.A. 5, 1911), cert. den. 223 U.S. 723, 56 L.Ed.
631, 32 Sup. Ct 524 (1911). There were earlier cases dealing with employee
repurchase agreements but not by a corporation. In Guernsey v. Cook, 120
Mass. 501 (1876) two majority shareholders agreed to repurchase. In Noyes v.
March, 123 Mass. 286 (1877) it does not appear what position the contemplated
repurchasers occupied with reference to the corporation. In Wilbur v. Stoepel,
82 Mich. 344, 46 N.W. 724, 21 Am. St. Rep. 568 (1890) the contract was between
two of the three stockholders in a corporation and the employee. In McIntyre
v. E. Bement's Sons, 146 Mich. 74, 109 N.W. 45 (1906) there was a repur-
chase agreement by the corporation but with a shareholder not an employee.
In Meurer v. American Moving Picture Mch. Co., 61 Misc. 281, 113 N.Y.
Supp. 719 (1908) an employee repurchase agreement was involved but the
case was decided on insufficient notice within the time available for demanding
performance. The principal case was followed in Re Fechheimer Fishel Co.,
212 Fed. 357 (C.C.A. 2d, 1914) where the court said: "A corporation's contract
to purchase its own stock, though valid in its inception cannot be enforced
unless a surplus exists when payment is due." It is true that in Mulford v.
Torrey Exploration Co., infra, n. 48, the court had held an employee repur-
chase contract a conditional sale at an earlier date.
10 145 App. Div. 406, 130 N.Y. Supp. 359 (1911), reversing 67 Misc. 402, 122 N.Y.
Supp. 609 (1910). Perhaps the best way to deal with employee repurchase
contracts would be to trace the history of this type of contract in a singlejurisdiction. New York has been chosen for this purpose because its cases
include most of the leading cases on the subject.
"Followed in Richards v. Weiner Co., infra, n. 12. The Federal rule may be
contra: Hamor v. Taylor-Rice Engineering Co., 84 Fed. 392 (Del. C.C.D.,
1897). And see Reith v. University Housing Corp., 247 Mich. 104, 225 N.W. 528
(1929).
12207 N.Y. 59, 100 N.E. 592 (1912).
13203 Fed. 720 (S.D. N.Y. 1913).
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employ him. The corporation was to have the right to discontinue
employment and thereupon bound itself to repurchase the employee's
stock if he so desired. The court followed the dictum in the Strodl
case and held that the burden was on the corporation to show insolv-
ency as a defense to the contract. In the Tichenor-Grand Co. case the
referee in bankruptcy disallowed the claim of a employee under a
repurchase agreement. The contract called for repurchase at the end
of three years upon sixty days' notice. A few months before the end
of the three years the corporation became insolvent. In the argument
one aspect of the employee situation seems to have been suggested for
the first time. It was argued that because of the employee's relation to
the corporation, his contract of repurchase should be governed by a
special rule entitling him to claim from the corporate treasury. This
argument was quickly brushed aside by Judge Learned Hand, who
said :"'
"If he is entered upon the books as a stockholder, and if his
shares figure as a part of the share capital actually issued, cer-
tainly all the evils which the statute15 means to forbid will arise
from allowing him thereafter secretly to deplete the treasury of
the company, as would arise if he reserved no right to do so.
Creditors have no means of knowing what part of the share-
holders have reserved this right, and how many may dip into
the corporate treasury, or, as in this case, come in to share with
them in insolvency. From the reason of the thing, therefore, the
fact [of employment] should make no difference."
There is one "out" for the employee which was suggested in the
Richards case.' 6 In that case the employee agreed to purchase the stock
for $10,000 but had paid only $3,000 and no shares had actually been
issued to him. Such an arrangement might be treated as an option or
contract to purchase rather than a purchase.
The next leading case in New York was Topke t, Loring &
Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz.17 In that case the corporation sold shares
to the defendant, who agreed to sell, and the corporation agreed to buy
at the book value when the term of employment ceased. When his
employment was terminated, the defendant refused to sell the shares
14 Ibid., at 721.
15 N.Y. Consol. L. (1909) c. 40, now Gilbert's Ann. Penal Code (1940) § 664,
forbidding purchases except out of surplus and making it a misdemeanor for
officers of a corporation to do otherwise. Section 14 of N. Y. Stk. Corp. L.
(1940) requires stockholder consent to such issue of stock to employees. Any
dissenting shareholder having preemptive rights is entitled to appraisal. This
provision was enforced in Matter of Stockwell, 210 App. Div. 753, 206 N.Y.
Supp. 834 (1924).
16Supra, n. 11.
17249 N.Y. 206, 163 N.E. 735 (1928) noted in (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 356, (1929)
15 Corn. L. Q. 108, (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 830, (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 831,
(1930) 3 St. John's L. Rev. 115, (1937) 12 St. John's L. Rev. 276, (1929) 6
N. Y. U. L. Q. 321, (1929) 39 Yale L. J. 902.
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he held to corporation which had only four shareholders. Upon suit
by the corporation for specific performance, the court denied relief,
treating the contract as one involving merely executory promises (and
thereby excluding employment as a consideration) and held that since
the defendant could only have enforced the contract against the cor-
poration of there were surplus profits, there was not the "binding" obli-
gation on the corporation essential to a contract. In calling the contract
illusory because one party-the corporation-was not bound, the court
is assuming that the existence or non-existence of profits was so far
within the control of the corporation as to equate the matter to the
situation where the corporation withdraws at will."' But is this a case
of withdrawal at will, and is the existence of profits a contingency
arbitrarily controllable by the corporation?"9 Failure to use an easy
interpretation making employment the consideration on the part of the
corporation2 threatened to jeopardize a valuable and desirable type of
contract. Later cases were left a ground of distinction because in this
case the corporation was closed and therefore control of surplus might
be very easy.2 1
There followed shortly Cross v. Beguelin22 where a corporation
which had sufficient surplus agreed to purchase the shares of plaintiff
stockholder. Before payment was fully made, the corporation became
insolvent and a creditors' committee took over the assets and paid all
existing debts. The plaintiff stockholder's claim for the balance due
was held payable out of the funds held by the creditors' committee
pro rata with the salary claims. Those having salary claims were direc-
tors who knew of the contract to purchase plaintiff's shares.
Why does not the logic of the Topken case apply equally here so
that there is no contract, there being iio consideration? In the present
case a closed corporation also is involved. The court did not mention
the Topeka case in this connection. It has been suggested that the
Topeka case has "now been pared down to hold that equity will not
grant to a corporation specific performance against a stockholder who
has received nothing but a promise which he may not be able to en-
I. Admittedly if one party can withdraw at will there is no contract. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (rev. ed., 1936) § 43.
19 If the existence of surplus is a contingency, then the contract is not illusory
but bilateral and binding. Many cases uphold contracts where the performance
on one side is entirely conditional on the happening of a future event. Green
v. Hollingshead, 172 Ark. 575, 290 S.W. 51 (1927); Beaumont Traction Co. v.
Texarkana & Ft. S. Ry., 103 Tex. 49, 123 S.W. 124 (1909). And see WILLISToN,
CONTRACTS (rev. ed., 1936) § 104, Restatement of Contracts (1932) § 2 (b).
20 As had been expressly done by the corporation in the Richards case supra,
n. 12.
21 But still there would be technical consideration.
-2252 N.Y. 262, 169 N.E. 378 (1929). Noted in (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 830,
(1930) 39 Yale L. J. 902, (1929) 29 CoL. L. Rxv. 1152.
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force"2' but the stockholder could get relief because his objection of
unfairness would not be available to the corporation.
The Topken case overlooked a similar case2 4 in Pennsylvania under
a similar statute25 in which the opposite result was reached and the
contract was not held illusory. In that case the corporation entered into
an agreement with an employee for the sale of shares. It was mutually
agreed that on cessation of employment or within thirty days there-
after the corporation would repurchase and the employee would sell.
The case involved a dispute as to income but the court assumed the
contract was valid.
The Topken case also overlooked the first New York case of
Strodl v. The Farish-Stafford Co.,2 6 holding such a contract binding,
and succeeding cases.2 7
The suggestion of some courts that the arrangement be viewed as
an option in the corporation to repurchase as distinguished from an
agreement to repurchase or an option in the employee to resell has been
discarded by others who hold the arrangement void if unreasonable as
a restraint on alienation, but valid if there is a statutory2s charter 29
or by-laws° provision permitting such restraint or if the restraint is
"reasonable." 2
'
23 (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 830 at 831.24 Revloc Supply Co. v. Troxell, 281 Pa. 424, 126 Atl. 774 (1924).
25 Penn. Bus. Corp. Law (1924) art. 3, § 320(7) provides that a corporation may
"purchase, take, receive or otherwise acquire, its own stock-except that no
such purchase or acquisition shall be made at a time when the net assets of
the corporation are less than its stated capital, or which would reduce its net
assets below its stated capital."
26 Cf. supra, n. 10 and as to its being the "first" New York case, supra, n. 9. How-
ever, the court in Topeka case does cite the Strodl case in another connection.
It might be justified in treating the Strodl case in silence because that was a
lower court (appellate division) decision.27 E.g., Richards v. Ernest Wiener Co., supra, n. 12, which the court in the
Topeka case considered dictum, arguing that there was an option in the
Richards case. This is a questionable interpretation of the opinion in the
Richards case which in turn seemed willing to raise a questionable doubt
about such clear language as "we shall purchase these 30 shares of stock from
you" under certain conditions. Richard v. Wiener, 207 N.Y. 59 at 63, 100 N.E.
592 (1912).28Kretzer v. Cole Bros. Co., 193 Mo. App. 99, 181 S.W. 1066 (1916).
29Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 1, 147 Atl. 312 (1929);
Tauchet, Inc. v. Tauchet, 264 Mass. 499, 163 N.E. 184 (1928); Bloomingdale
v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc. 646, 177 N.Y. Supp. 873 (1919).
30 Sterling Loan & Investment Co. v. Litel, 75 Colo. 34, 223 Pac. 753 (1924).
But see: Ireland v. Globe Milling Co., 19 R.I. 180, 32 Atl. 921 (1895).
3' People ex rel. Rudaitis v. Galskis, 233 Ill. App. 414 (1924) where the restraint
was held reasonable where the corporation was allowed to substitute a pur-
chaser that it thought more suitable, at the prevailing market price. But see:
People ex rel. Malcolm v. Lake Sand Corp., 251 Ill. App. 499 (1929) where
it was held unreasonable to require the consent of the majority of the stock-
holders. Charter provisions also must be reasonable. Holding individual agree-
ments valid where reasonable is: Model Clothing House v. Dickinson, 146
Minn. 367, 178 N.W. 957 (1920).
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It would thus seem best in order to avoid the want of consideration
argument of the Topken caseu and in order to avoid any difficulty as
to restraint on alienation to either
1) specify employment as the consideration3 3 or
2) to insert an option to buy at market price or if there is no
market, at a figure to be determined by appraisers and to insert
the provision in the stock certificate .3
Repurchase contracts are subject to the defense of insolvency by the
corporation, leaving the shareholder remediless as is the general rule
as to contracts to purchase one's own stock35 as regards any action
against the corporation.
The minority jurisdictions refusing to recognize repurchase agree-
ments as intra vires constitute a smaller group than the minority hold-
ing that general agreements to purchase its own stock are ultra vires.
The leading case on another distinction is Ophir Consolidate Mines
Co. v. Brynteson.3 6 That case did not involve an employee repurchase
agreement but a general repurchase agreement. Another point was in-
volved in the case but on the repurchase agreement, the contract simply
provided 7 that the corporation agreed "to return to said John Brynte-
son [the purchaser] said Fifteen Thousand (15,000) Dollars, with
interest on the same at the rate of six per cent per annum, eighteen
months after the date hereof if said John Brynteson be not satisfied
with aforesaid investment."
In this case the corporation was chartered in Colorado. The statute
in that state8 forbade the use of corporate funds "for the purchase of
stock in their own company or corporation except such as may be
forfeited for the nonpayment of assessments thereon." Referring to
this statute the court said:
"This agreement is in no sense within the meaning or object of
the provision referred to. The stock was held in the treasury3 9
of the company to raise funds for improvements, upon such
terms of sale as were adopted by the president. The right to so
hold and own stock remains in the corporation until an absolute
32 Cf. supra, n. 20. Other devices, of course, can be used to avoid want of con-
sideration.
38 As in the Richards case, mipra n. 11.
s The first to avoid any "unreasonableness" and the last to comply with § 15
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act which provides that no restriction of a
by-law is valid unless stated on the stock certificate.
35 Cf. Nemmers, Power of a Corporation to Purchase Its Own Stock, 1942 Wis.
L. REv., 161 at 171, section on insolvency. But if the corporation has no creditor
and no injury will be done to a fellow shareholder, a corporation may purchase
its own shares even though insolvent. Davies v. Montana Auto Finance Corp.,
86 Mont. 500, 284 Pac. 267 (1930).
36 143 Fed. 829 (C.C.A. 7, 1906).
37 Ibid., at 830.
38 Mills, Ann. Stat. Colo. (1891) § 485.
39 This stock is not properly referred to as treasury stock; it is authorized but
unissued stock.
1942]
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sale is made. No such sale arose under the agreement in suit.
It was of the well-recognized class, known as a contract of "sale
or return," [citing case] where the title passes for the time
being, but subject to the option of the purchaser to rescind and
return the property within the time stipulated. With the exercise
of the option the contract of sale terminates and the right and
title of the corporation is restored to the original status. No sale
has been accomplished, and no purchase or repurchase arises
upon the part of the corporation through this return of its un-
sold stock."
For its position the court cited Sturm v. Baker 0 which was a case
involving a consignment of arms on sale or return, and Vent v. Duluth
Coffee & Spice Co.,41 which was a case involving an option in a pur-
chaser of shares to demand the purchase price back but not involving
a statute, holding it a conditional sale42 and citing as authority Browne
v. St. Paul Plow Works,4s which was a similar case and which in turn
cited three early Massachusetts cases4 4 involving conditional sales of
stock between individuals. The inch by inch progress of these cases
needs no commentary. It is interesting to note that none of the cases
mentioned cites any of the early purchase (as distinguished from
repurchase) cases. It seems that the purchase and repurchase cases had
a disassociated development at least until 1915.
The Ophir case and its conditional sale rule have been followed45
in a few states only.
Besides the conditional sale theory, there are other schemes for
allowing a corporation to repurchase. One is to view the purchase and
repurchase elements as constituting one entire contract. 46 In the leading
case of Porter v. Plymouth Gold Mining Co.,4" the court said: "There
was but one contract, viz., for the sale and repurchase of the stock,
40 150 U.S. 312, 14 Sup. Ct. 99, 37 L.ed. 1093 (1893).
4' 64 Minn. 307, 67 N.W. 70 (1896).
42 No distinction for the present purposes appears to be recognized between sale
and return and conditional sale in the matter of title as between buyer and
seller.
43 62 Minn. 90, 64 N.W. 66 (1895).44 Thompson v. Alger, 12 Metc. 428 (Mass. 1847) ; Thorndike v. Locke, 98 Mass.
340 (1867) ; Pearson v. Neason, 120 Mass. 53 (1876).
45 Schulter v. Boulevard Gardens Land Co., 164 Cal. 464, 129 Pac. 582 (1913);
Mulford v. Torrey Exploration Co., 45 Colo. 81, 100 Pac. 596 (1909);
Williams v. Maryland Glass Corp., 134 Md. 320, 106 Atl. 755 (1919) ; Lyons v.
Sinder, 136 Minn. 252, 161 N.W. 532 (1917) ; Ephraim Downs v. N. J. Central
Power & Light Co., 115 N.J. Eq. 348, 170 Atl. 835 (1934). But in many states
this "sale or return" idea has been rejected inferentially or sub silentio, e.g.,
in Delaware, In re International Radiator Co., 10 Del. Ch. 358, 92 Atl. 255(1914); Pasotti v. U. S. Guardian Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 1, 156 Atl. 255 (1931)(not an employee situation) ; Hegarty v. American Com. Power Corp., 20
Del. Ch. 231, 174 Atl. 273 (1934) (employee situation).
46Porter v. Plymouth Gold Mining Co., 29 Mont. 347, 74 Pac. 938 (1904);
Latulippo v. New England Inv. Co., 77 N.H. 31, 86 Atl. 361 (1913); Griffin
v. Bankers' Realty Inv. Co., 105 Nebr. 419, 181 N.W. 169 (1920).4 7 Supra, n. 46.
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each object being a consideration for the other. This contract was
entire and indivisible. The contract could not be sustained unless the
contract of repurchase could be enforced. Therefore, if a portion of
the contract is ultra vires, the whole contract must fall." Another
theory is that even though statutes prohibit corporations from purchas-
ing their own stocks, this prohibition is to be construed as not apply-
ing to treasury stock as opposed to stock of the original issue.48
In only a few jurisdictions have such repurchase agreements been
held unenforceable.
49
In view of the different treatment accorded repurchase agreements
and the evident effort (even in jurisdictions which are in the minority
on the general power to purchase one's own stock) to find them valid,
the question may well be raised whether repurchase agreements are
covered by the recent statutory enactments on the general subject of the
power of a corporation to purchase its own stock. Few cases have yet
arisen under the new statutes. No express provision for employee
repurchase agreements is made in the recent statutes of Illinois, Mary-
land and Michigan although the language in some of the statuteso
seems broad enough to remove reasonable dougts. Kansas,51 a very
recent state to revamp its corporation laws, expressly provides for the
problem of allowing purchases "from one who, as an employee other
than as an officer or director, has purchased such shares from the cor-
poration under an agreement reserving the corporation [sic] the option
to repurchase or obligating it to repurchase." California52 has the same
48Mulford v. Torry Exploration Co., 45 Colo. 81, 100 Pac. 596 (1909) ; Wilson
v. Torchon Lace & Mercantile Co., 167 Mo. App. 305, 149 S.W. 1156 (1912);
Korn v. Cody Detective Agency, 76 Wash. 540, 136 Pac. 1155, 50 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 1073 (1913). This distinction is criticized in (1927) 36 Mich. L. Rev.
790 at 794. It has not been followed by the S.E.C. See, F. T. C., Release No.
131 (Mar. 13, 1934). (The Federal Trade Commission was the forerunner
of the Securities and Exchange Commission.)
49Pothier v. Ried Air Spring Co., 103 Conn. 380, 130 At. 383 (1925); Civil
Service Inv. Ass'n. v. Thomas, 138 Tenn. 77, 195 S.W. 775 (1917).
50 E.g. Illinois Smith-Hurd Ann. Stat. (1935) ch. 32, § 157.6 says: "A corpora-
tion shall have power to purchase, take, receive, or otherwise acquire, hold,
own, pledge, transfer or otherwise dispose of its shares."
51 Gen. Stat. Kans. (1939) 17-3004 (3).
Cal. Civ. Code (1941) § 342 (3). It is interesting to note that the California
statute gives preferential treatment to employee repurchase agreements, per-
mitting the execution of such agreements from any surplus thereby placing
such agreements in the class of compromising claims, buying out dissenters,
eliminating fractional shares, and redemption agreements) whereas usual
purchase or repurchase agreements are limited to earned surplus. Employee
stock purchase plans are authorized by Cal. Civ. Code § 297a, but that section
contains no limitation as to officers and directors. Directors and officers
may secure repurchase, however, if there is earned surplus. Cal. Civ. Code
(1941) § 342 (3). These two parts of the California statute must be con-
strued together or there is a conflict.
1942]
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provision. This section, except for the proviso as to officers and direc-
tors, is taken from the Louisiana statute53 and the Ohio statute.5 4
There is at least one Maryland case indicating that employee repur-
chase agreements are not receiving treatment different from general
purchase agreements. That is Reed and Fibre Products Corp. v. Rosen-
tha155 in which the corporation employed Rosenthal for two years pay-
ing him partly in stock which the corporation agreed to repurchase if no
extension of employment was worked out. The president also agreed in-
dividually to repurchase. The suit was against the corporation to force
it to issue shares and against the president to repurchase them.5 6 The
case came up on demurrer and in a dictum the court said "there is
nothing in the record to indicate that either of these conditions had or
had not been complied with; but there being what on its face is a valid
contract of the corporation to purchase [i.e., repurchase], upon certain
contingencies, shares of its own stock, we must, without any showing
to the contrary, presume that the necessary condition had been com-
plied with.157
53 Dart's Gen. Stat. (1939) § 1103 (I) (d) first enacted in 1928, Acts, No. 250
§ 23.
54 Throckmorton's Ohio Code (1940) § 8623-41(4).
55 153 Md. 501, 138 AtI. 665 (1927).
58 Ibid., at 516.
5T Ibid., at 514. . . .. ,..
